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Summary
The environment, energy and climate are transboundary
issues that require cooperative action to sustainably
address. Tomeet our energy requirements, both the UK
and Europe are heavily reliant on energy imports.
As international concerns rise over the impacts of climate
change and over increasing levels of geopolitical unrest,
UK government energy policymust balance the need
for competitive energy prices, with the requirements to
ensure security of supply and to achieve environmental
sustainability.
Much of the UK’s environmental policy and legislation
derives fromEuropeanUnion (EU) Directives. Some
sectors of industrymay argue that this imposes a burden
on their business, whilst othersmay argue that it leads
to stability of government policies and that it enables
long-termdecision-makingand investment. Environmental
groups do contend that EuropeanDirectives provide a
much-needed safety net, to protect the environment over
timescales longer than aUK electoral cycle. This safety
net is particularly effective because the successful
implementation of EUDirectivesmust be evidenced,
protecting the progress of these policies, particularly
during periods of financial stress.
As part of a larger grouping of countries, negotiations on
theworld stage (such as climate negotiations) can be
conductedwithmore authority thanwould be possible as
an individual country, since the countries represented by
the EU collectively represent a larger proportion of the
global population, and account for a larger proportion of
consumption and emissions.
Cross-European research and development (R&D)
projects have awider geographical scope, cover a broader
range of environments and drawupon a larger pool of
skills and researchers thanwould be possible if projects
were centredwithin a single country. Such projects are
facilitated by a number of EUmechanisms – though it is
possible that non-EU countries can gain access to EU
research activities, e.g. through associate country status.
The implications for energy, environment and climate, of
amove to leave the EU are not clear. It is clear, however,
that environmental policy in the UK has historically been
driven by European legislation, that the UK is deeply
embeddedwithin the European energymarket, and that
the UK (and European) economies are heavily reliant on
energy imports.Whatever the UK decides, it is critical
that improved energy security remains a government
priority, and that we adopt amove towards a fully
integrated energy, environmental and climate policy.
Introduction
Although the UKmakes environmental, energy and
climate policy within the UKParliament inWestminster,
andwithin the devolved administrations, domestic laws
have been increasingly shaped by EU legislation, and
to a lesser extent wider international conventions and
agreements (UKELA, 2016). Figure 1depicts schematically
the overlap betweenUK, EU and international legislation,
demonstrating that UK environmental, energy and
climate policy are always informed by international
obligations towhich the UK is party, and that a large
proportion of this legislation is shaped by EU legislation.
Some domestic legislation arises fromEU legislation in
the absence of international conventions and agreements.
TheUKmust evidence the successful implementation –
or progress towards implementation – of EU legislation,
and likewise for international obligations.
Figure 1Schematic representation
of how UK environmental, energy
and climate policy is shaped by EU
legislation and by international
agreements and conventions.
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Environment
Environmental Policy, Legislation& Implementation
In the UK, ‘the environment’ is generally defined to
mean air, water and land. The regulatory bodieswith
responsibility for protection of the environment in the UK
are, principally: Environment Agency, Natural Resources
Wales, Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland,
and Local Authorities (UKELA, 2016).
Since joining the European Community (as it was then)
in 1972, European environmental legislation has
increasingly shaped domestic environmental laws
(UKELA, 2016). A series of single issue Directiveswere
madewithin the EU (e.g. theNitrates Directive to limit
nitrogen pollution of water course andwater bodies),
but these single issue Directives have increasingly been
replaced by “framework” Directives (e.g. theWaste
FrameworkDirective, theWater FrameworkDirective)
and “daughter” Directives (e.g. the daughter End of Life
Vehicles Directive). The frameworkDirectives attempt
to deliver an integrated approach to environmental
protection (UKELA, 2016).
To showhowEU legislation has evolved and how this has
influenced environmental law in the UK, take policy on
Nitrate pollutants as an example. The ECNitrates
Directive (91/676/EC) was a single issue directive that
aimed to “protect water quality across Europe by
preventing nitrates fromagricultural sources polluting
ground and surfacewaters and by promoting the use of
good farming practices” (EU, 2016a), and supported
drinkingwater quality as outlined under the earlier EC
DrinkingWater Directive of 1980. Specificmanagement
strategies to reduce the levels of nitrates had to be
drawn up by 1995 and implemented by 1999. TheNitrate
Directive shaped law in the UK, and Scotland in
particular, as follows:
1991: In response to theNitrates Directive, the UK
establishedNitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs),
where nitrate concentrations in drinkingwater
sources exceeded, orwas at risk of exceeding,
the limit of 50mg/l set by the 1980 ECDrinking
Water Directive (Defra, 2016a). Voluntary
agriculturalmeasureswere introduced by UK
MAFF (nowDefra) in England andWales, and
paymentsweremade to farmers in theNSAs
who complied. Themeasures aimed to reduce
nitrate levelswhere theywere too high, and
provide information about themost effective
agriculturalmanagement actions to reduce
these concentrations (Defra, 2016). The scheme
was piloted in ten areas in 1990, later expanded
to 32 areas, and closed to further new entrants
in 1998 (although existing agreements continued
for their full five-year term) (Defra, 2016).
1996: NSAswere broadened into Nitrate Vulnerable
Zones (NVZs), defined as catchmentswhere
nitrate levels exceeded 50mg/l orwere likely to
in the future. Sixty eight NVZswere identified,
representing an area of 650,000 ha (mostly in
East Anglia and theMidlands; Defra, 2016b)
and all NSAs occurredwithin NVZ boundaries
(Defra, 2016a). Additional NVZswere designated
under new rules in 2002.Within NVZs,
agriculturalmeasures to reduce nitrate pollution
are considered good practice and so are not
compensated, and farmers are obliged to follow
certain approaches.
2000: The EUWater FrameworkDirective (WFD)
entered into force in December 2000 (EU, 2016b)
and has shapedUK policy since. TheWFD largely
superseded theNitrates Directive in terms of
protectingwater bodies fromnitrate pollution,
but was broader in its aims, including ambition
to deliver cleaner rivers and lakes, groundwater
and coastal beaches (EU, 2016b), andwas
integrated across a range of pollutants rather
than solely nitrate. Responsibility for reporting
WFD compliance lieswith the environmental
regulatory body for each of the UKDevolved
Administrations (Defra/Welsh Government,
2014, SEPA, 2016).
2003: In response to theWFD, Scotland developed the
Water Environment andWater Services
(Scotland) Act (WEWSAct) of 2003. In 2011, this
was backed up by TheWater Environment
(Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations
which apply regulatory controls over activities
whichmay affect Scotland’s water environment
(SEPA, 2016).
EU legislation has shaped domestic environmental law,
and holds to accountMember Stateswho do not
implement them. In December 2000, the European Court
of Justice ruled that the UK had failed to fully implement
theNitrates Directive, because the UK had only
protected drinkingwater resources. TheUKwas
obliged to either implement the Directive fully, or pay
non-compliance fees (Defra, 2016b). In 2012, the
European Commission evaluated the implementation
of theWFD and, though proving challenging for all
Member States, the aspiration tomeet the demands of
the Directive had delivered substantial improvement in
themanagement of water resources across the UK and
EU (European Commission, 2012).
Many environments and environmental issues are
transboundary, and EU-wide participation in
environmental protection and sustainablemanagement
practices are therefore advantageous.
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Implementing EU legislation has presented both
opportunities and challenges forUKenvironmental law
practitioners. A report byUKELA (2012) identified
several problematic issues, including a lack of
integration and coherence of environmental legislation
at EU level, and increasing fragmentation of
environmental law across the devolved administrations.
The report suggested thatmore coherent and cohesive
environmental law, applicable over larger geographical




In 2014, the UK consumed 198.7million tonnes of oil
equivalent energy (DECC, 2015). The vastmajority of
this energy consumption, 86%,was derived from
hydrocarbons in the formof coal, oil and gas (Figure 2).
Of the remaining 14%of energy consumed, around one
thirdwas produced fromburning of biomass andwaste,
and approximately two thirdswas primary electricity,
mainly nuclear. In total, 7% of the 2014UK energy
consumptionwas derived from renewable sources
(DECC, 2015). UK energy consumption is dominated by
three sectors; transport (37.9%), domestic (26.7%), and
industry (16.8%). Only the domestic sector has shown
some decline in demand in recent years, as a result of
energy efficiencymeasures (DECC, 2015a).
Energymarkets are important for the UK’s trade
operations. TheUK imports and exports energy, but has
been a net importer of energy (i.e. importingmore than
it produces) since 2004. Over the last five years, imports
of energy have increased dramatically with 46%of the
energy consumed in 2014 being imported. TheUK
imports energy fromawide range of countries,
depending on fuel type. Key imports are fromRussia
(coal and petroleumproducts), Norway (crude oil and
gas), Qatar (LiquefiedNatural Gas, LNG) and OPEC
countries (crude oil). The UK’s largest supplier of
transport fuels is Russia, particularly diesel, with
aviation fuel being sourcedmainly fromAsia. In 2014
net imports accounted for around 45%of gas demand,
and this value is expected to increase (Kopp, 2015)
particularly as the role of natural gas inmeeting future
UK energy demand is strengthened (c.f. speech by
Amber RuddMP, on 18thNovember 2015). Norway
accounted for over 50%of gas imports in 2014, a further
25%was imported as LNG fromQatar.
EUEnergyConsumption andSupply
The EU had a total energy inland consumption in 2013
of 1661million tonnes of oil equivalent (European
Commission, 2015a), around 5%ofwhichwas consumed
in the UK. Currently, 15%of EU energy consumption is
generated from renewable sources, and under the
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) this should increase
to 20%by 2020 (Directive 2009/28/EC). EU Energy
consumption is dominated by the same three sectors as
the UK, with transport accounting for just under a third
of demand, and domestic and industry accounting for
approximately a quarter of demand (European
Commission, 2015a).
The EU is a significant net importer of energy. The
percentage of energy imports in the EU has risen
steadily from43% in 1990 to 53%of energy consumed
in 2013. Themost significant energy imports, as a
percentage of consumption, are solid fuel (44%),
petroleumand petroleumproducts (87%) and natural
gas (65%). Of the European nations, the UK imported the
4th highest amount (million tonnes of oil equivalent) of
energy, behind Germany, France and Italy (European
Commission, 2015a).
By far the largest supplier of energy to the EU is Russia,
which supplies 39%of natural gas, 34%of crude oil, and
33.5% of solid fuels. Natural gas and crude oil are also
imported in significant quantities fromNorway, the
remainder of imports are sourced froma variety of
nations including Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
and Kazakhstan (European Commission, 2015a).
TheEnergy TrilemmaandEnergyGovernance
The ‘Energy Trilemma’ is recognised as the need to
balance competitiveness, security of supply and
environmental sustainability on a national and
international basis. Governance of this trilemma is
increasingly important due to rising concern over the
impacts of climate change, global geopolitical unrest
and the need to address fuel poverty; in 2013, 10.4% of
households in Englandwere estimated to be in fuel
poverty (DECC, 2015c), in Scotland this figurewas
35.8%,mainly as a consequence of higherwinter fuel
consumption (Scottish Government Statistics).
Figure 2UK Inland Energy consumption 2014.
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Energy Union is a strategic priority for the Commission
(European Commission, 2014). Energy Union policy
seeks to address the challenges posed by the Energy
Trilemma, identifying five target areas: energy security;
a single internal EU energymarket; energy efficiency;
emissions reductions; and research and innovation. In
November 2015, The European Energy Council agreed
to the introduction of a European Energy Governance
system including the introduction of National Energy
and Climate Plans that “will serve as the reference
points formonitoring the achievement of all EU energy
policy objectives and targets” (EU Energy Council, 2015).
Energy Governancewill take into account “EU-binding
or indicative 2030 climate and energy targets”, andwill
be “reviewing and developing legislation related to
emissions reduction, energy efficiency and renewables
to underpin the agreed 2030 targets” (EU Energy
Council, 2015). TheHouse of Lords (HoL) Report on
EUEnergy Governance, December 2015, welcomed
the introduction of National Energy and Climate Plans
including “themove to longer-termplanning and the
assessment of progress against EU level targets”
calling on the UKGovernment tomeet the
Commission’s deadline for development of national
plans by 2018. TheHoL urged the UKGovernment to
“domore to report against its own progress on its
energy and climate goals” and noted the critical
importance of long termpolicy signals to energy
investors. They also recommended that the “UK
Government should go to greater lengths to explain
to consumers the financial and security benefits of a
more integrated EU energymarket”.
Energy security is the UKGovernment’s number
one priority (DECCMinister of State, HOL EUEnergy
Governance, 2015). The Government’s response to
energy security has tended to focus on risk (Ekins et al.,
2011), whereas the EUEnergy Union response ismuch
broader. Key tools in increasing energy security are:
demand side response in which consumers sign up to
schemeswhich reward them for changing how and
when they use their electricity and energy storage.
For electrical power, energy storage takes the formof
batteries or hydropower. For gas, energy storage is
defined by the time taken towithdraw it:medium-range
and long-range storage are in the formof injection into
on-shore and off-shore underground reservoirs
(respectively); for short-range storage, gas is converted
to LNG. Over 50%of total gas storage capacity in Europe
is containedwithin three countries: Germany, Italy and
France. Europe’s gas storage capacity is around 98
billion cubicmetres (European Commission, 2015c);
which equates to approximately 85 days of average gas
consumption (based on data fromEuropeanCommission
2015a). The UK has a relatively low capacity for gas
storage, equivalent to 21.5 days’ worth of supply at
averageUK consumption rates, or 10%of total demand
for gas inwinter (European Commission, 2015b).
Security of supply of gas is therefore high priority to the
UKGovernment. A pipeline interconnector between the
UK andBelgiumenables the UK to access Europe’s gas
supply (and stored gas), and these imports havemet a
significant proportion of gas demand during times of
lowUK gas storage levels (DECC, 2014). To-date, the
majority of disruptions to UK gas supply have been
technical in nature rather than geopolitical (Le Fevre,
2013), for example, inMarch 2013, a combination of
technical difficulties and cold conditions left the UK
with less than one days’ worth of gas supply in storage
(DECC, 2014).
The transport sector consumes themost energy in
the UK and the EU, and these fuels have the greatest
import dependency; imported crude accounted for 54%
of total processing in 2013 (UKPIA, 2015). UK refineries
are configured tomeet historically higher demand for
petrol and fuel oil, leading to amodern day deficit of,
for example, diesel and jet fuel, and changing refinery
production tomeet demandwill requiremajor
investment. TheUK already relies on Russia for over
one third of total diesel imports in 2014 (IEA, 2016).
There are few refineries still operating in the UK, which
presents a risk to supply reliability. For example, while
Grangemouth refinery provides Scotlandwith a robust
supply of petroleumproducts, its dependency on a
single refinery, is high risk (Purvin&Gertz, 2013).
The EU refining sector is also struggling due to changes
in demand andmarket forces.Without state aid, further
closures of EU refineries are expected, whichwould
leave the EUmore dependent on the international
refined productmarkets.
Climate
ClimatePolicy, Legislation and Implementation
As noted above, while someUK laws are derived from
EU legislation, someUK environmental laws arise from
international Conventions and Agreements. An example
of UK Laws arising from International Treaty is
legislation surrounding climate change. TheUnited
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)was signed at the Rio summit in 1992,
and it is the Conventionwhich led to the development
of the Climate Change Act (2008) at UK level (UK
Government, 2008) and the Climate Change (Scotland)
Act in 2009 (Scottish Government, 2009). Both of these
Acts areworld leading in their ambition for greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission reduction (with a commitment to an
80% cut in emissions relative to 1990 levels by 2050),
and aremore ambitious than the collective ambition of
the EU, at least for 2020 targets (EU, 2016d).
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Within the UNFCCC climate negotiations, the EU
negotiates as a block (UNFCCC, 2016). As noted by
the UNFCCC (2016): “The 28members of the European
Unionmeet in private to agree on common negotiating
positions. The country that holds the EUPresidency
– a position that rotates every sixmonths – then speaks
for the EuropeanUnion and its 28member states.
As a regional economic integration organisation,
the EuropeanUnion itself can be, and is, a Party to the
Convention. However, it does not have a separate vote
from itsmembers.”
Given that the EU accounted for 10.3% of total global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 (the third largest
greenhouse gas emitter after China and the USA),
compared to the UK’s 1.4% of total global emissions
(WRI, 2016; Figure 3), the importance of the EU
grouping as a global emitter and, thereby, as part
of the potential solution, is clear.
The EU has a played a strong role in bringing ambitious
climate targets to the UNFCCC negotiations, and has
been instrumental in helping to deliver the first truly
global climate deal at the 21st Conference of Parties to
the UNFCCC in Paris in December 2015.
In 2015, Norway entered into an agreementwith the
EU about a joint fulfillment of the EU climate targets,
implying that non-EU countries can, through associate
country status, adopt these policies. Furthermore, the
31 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA)
participate in the EUEmissions Trading System (ETS).
Thus, a UK departure from the EUwould not negate UK
inclusion in these legislations if it remained in the EEA.
Environment, Energy andClimateResearch
&Development
The climate is a global commons (i.e. all countries share
the global climate system; Hansen et al., 2013), the
small countries of the EU (e.g. the UK) by themselves
have a relatively small global climate footprint, but
collectively the EU has the third largest climate footprint
in theworld (WRI, 2016). Since climate impacts vary
between regions, it is reasonable to conduct climate
impact research at any scale (e.g. within a country),
but being able to assess impacts across awider
geographical region allows trends to bemore easily
detected and causes attributed.
The EU has encouraged close collaboration among
environmental researchers acrossMember States. The
projects arising from the EUs Framework Programmes,
and themore recent Horizon-2020 programme, have
brought together researchers fromacross Europe
(EU, 2016c). Cross-European research projects have a
wider geographical scope, cover a broader range of
environments and drawupon a larger pool of skills and
researchers thanwould be possible if projectswere
centredwithin individual countries. From the authors’
experience, this is generally regarded to have been a
positive influence on the quality, scope and societal and
policy impact of the research undertaken.
R&D in the UK has benefited greatly fromEU funding
mechanisms, as evidenced by the results of the 2014
Research Excellent Framework; the EUGovernment is
the only source of research funding that has increased
since 2004, and the UK is one of the largest beneficiaries
of the Horizon2020 funds. EU funding for R&D is unlikely
to decline. For example, one of the five principal aims for
the European Commission’s Energy Union policy,
proposed in 2014, is research and innovation.
The beneficial nature of the EU for research and
development outcomes is supported by the fact that
non-EU countries such as Switzerland participate in EU
projects fromSwiss contributions (SERI, 2016). This also
demonstrates that the pan-European benefits of EU
could, in-theory, be accessed fromaUK outside the EU
through associate country status.
Discussion
A key contention for UKmembership of the European
Union is being subject to European Commission Policy
Directives.Whilstmembership reduces the ability of the
UK to create individual policies tailored to national need,
it also has significant advantages. Chief amongst these
is that European policy is less changeable andmore
long-lasting thanUK policy, as it is less subject to the
vagaries of four year government cycles. A failure to
commit to long-termplanning can lead toweak policy
signals and business uncertainty, which in turn can
result in underinvestment in infrastructure and
technology.
Figure 3: GHG emissions in 2010 (Mt CO2e) for the world,
EU28 and the UK (data from WRI, 2016).
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A recent Institute for European Environmental Policy
(IEEP) report identified thatmany of the key
environmental challenges in the UK are those that
require an enhanced degree of cooperation and
coherence; “governmentsworking together asmuch
as businesses in a supply chain”, and the EU serves
to facilitate cooperative action and the exchange
of ideas towards sustainable practices. The report
concludes that “a potential UK departure from the
EUwould leave the British environment in amore
vulnerable and uncertain position than if it were to
remain as amember of the EU”, but these effectsmay
be lessened if the UK remains in the EEA following
departure from the EU (Baldock et al., 2016a).
Energy does not recognise national boundaries and
the interconnected nature of energy in Europemeans
thatMember States are affected by the policy and
development decisions of their neighbours. New
infrastructure and technology developments are
required to complete the internal energymarket,
increase European interconnection, diversify supply,
meet carbon emissions targets and, importantly,
ensure energy security (Godzimirski et al, 2015;
HoL EUEnergy Governance report, 2015). Many of
these are transboundary, longer termdevelopments,
which EU governancewill facilitate.
Longer-termEuropean policies allow formore
strategic research and development. Examples include
longer-term climate solutions, such as negative
emission technologies (Smith et al., 2016), carbon
capture and storage technologies, and investment in
digital smartmetering. The latter has the potential
both to reduce total energy consumption and to reduce
peak energy use, by applying price incentives for
energy usewhen demand is low. One downside of the
longer termEuropean policy cycle, however, is that
policy change is slower, and as a consequence,
institutionsmay be less nimble in responding to
changing drivers than thosewithin independent
countrieswith national policies. Member States,
however, are not prevented from implementing
more ambitious domestic environmental legislation,
as for example, the UKClimate Change Act (2008).
Another benefit of longer-termpolicies throughout the
EU is the potential for collaboration and collective
learning betweenMember States.Member Statesmust
evidence the successful implementation – or progress
towards implementation – of EUDirectives.Management
and implementation plans for eachMember Statemust
be approved, asmust themonitoring approach, bringing
independent quality assurance. Information about
the quality of performance gives scope to compare
progress, identify common issues, serving to strengthen
and streamline the policies and themanagement
strategies implemented. Further, governments are
morewilling and able to address challenging
environmental issuesworking together rather than
independently (Baldock et al., 2016b).
Non-EU countries can, through associate country
status, adopt EU policy. For example, in 2015Norway
entered into an agreementwith the EU about a joint
fulfillment of the EU climate targets. Norway is also
implanting theWFD and the Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive, though the implementation of
these policies lags significantly behind EUMember
States (European Commission, 2016e; EFTA, 2014)
thereby supporting the notion that EUmembershipmay
serve to enhance – rather than retard – adoption of
environmental policy). There is concern that, should the
UK leave the EU, future UK governmentsmight relax
EU environmental standards, particularly if concerns
aboutmarket competitiveness becomemore acute in a
liberalised trading environment (Baldock et al., 2016b).
The energy supply sector is the largest single source of
the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2013, accounting
for 33% (DECC, 2015b). The low carbon agenda
contributes to several energy security objectives (lower
energy demand; diversity of supply) but could leave the
UKmuchmore import dependent (Ekins et al, 2011).
Thismight strengthen the argument for the single
energymarkets envisaged by the EUEnergy Union.
The supply of refined products, such as diesel and
aviation fuel in the UK (and EU) is notably dependent
on imports fromoutside the EU (e.g. Russia), and this
will increase should further EU refineries close.
One issue of current debate is that, by comparison to
the UK, the EU has a high reliance onRussian gas
imports. This is largely a consequence of geography
and the existing gas pipeline infrastructure; the UK
imports over 50%of its gas through the subsea
Langeled pipeline that runs directly fromNorway to
England (DECC, 2015b). Investment in additional
infrastructure to improve connectivity within Europe can
reduce the dependency of someEUnations onRussia
as a single gas supplier. The EU has identified the need
for investment in such infrastructures (EU Energy
Council, 2015). Improved connectivity would also serve
to improve UK energy security; there is uncertainty over
the future of Norwegian gas production beyond 2020,
due to a lack of certainty on the extent of known
resources (DECC, 2014).
It is worth noting that issues of non-financial constraints
to energy challenges, and behavioural aspects of energy
diversity and energy demand reduction are important
and should not be underestimated. However, little is
known about how these are affected by EU association.
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The introduction of National Energy and Climate Plans
in the EU by 2018 could forman important step towards
an integrated international energy and climate
agreement. Given that EU policy tends to be longer
termand less changeable thanUK policy, negotiations
on theworld stage, including energy and climate
negotiations, can be conductedwithmore authority
thanwould be possible as an individual country, since
the larger collection of countries represented by the EU
represents a larger proportion of the global population,
and accounts for a larger proportion of consumption
and emissions.
Among researchers, collaboration at an EU level is
generally regarded to have been a positive influence
on the quality, scope and societal and policy impact
of climate research.Models exist to access these
benefits fromoutside the EU but these could require
government funding.
Conclusions
Muchof theUK’s environmental policy and legislation
derives fromEUDirectives. Somesectors of industrymay
argue that this imposes aburdenon their business,whilst
othersmayargue that it leads to stability of government
policies and that it enables long-termdecision-making
and investment. Environmental groupsdo contend that
EuropeanDirectives provide amuch-needed safety net,
to protect the environment over timescales longer thana
UKelectoral cycle, particularly duringperiods of financial
stress.
The implications onenergy, environment and climate,
of amove to leave theEuropeanUnion arenot clear.
However,what is clear, is that theUK is deeply embedded
within theEuropeanenergymarket, that environmental
policy in theUKhashistorically beendrivenbyEuropean
legislation, and that theUK (andEuropean) economies
areheavily reliant onenergy imports.Whatever theUK
decides, it is critical that improvedenergy security
remains aGovernment priority, and thatweadopt a
move towards a fully integrated energy, environmental
and climate policy.
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